by Jeet Sinha

All 9-judge bench Supreme Court judgment [2024 Updated]

9-Judge bench formation

A 9-judge bench is formed according to Article 145 of constitution, it provides the rule for the size of bench to decide a particular matter. Under Article 145(3), it is stated that formation of a constitution bench consisting of minimum 5 judges is necessary where substantial question of law as to interpretation of constitution or for purpose of hearing any reference under Article 143 is before supreme court. The higher number of judges is also required to over turn a decision of Supreme Court’s lower bench.

The Sea Customs Case (AIR 1963 SC 1760).

The 9-judge bench consisting of SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ); DAS, S.K.; GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.; SARKAR, A.K.; WANCHOO, K.N.; HIDAYATULLAH, M.; GUPTA, K.C. DAS; SHAH, J.C.; AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA decided on:

It is a Presidential reference case under Article 143(1) of the Constitution to get the opinion of the Supreme Court on the true scope of Article 289 of the Constitution. The majority of the judges interpreted Article 289 w.r.t E. 41 and 42 of List I Schedule VII. The majority expressed that Union could impose taxes indirectly on the property.

“The right has been hedged in by considerations of respective powers and responsibilities of the Union in relation to the States, and those of the States in relation to citizens or inter se or in relation to the Union.”

State Trading Co. of India v. CTO (1963).

The 9-judge bench consisting of Sinha, Bhuvneshwar P.(Cj), Das, S.K. & Gajendragadkar, P.B., Sarkar, A.K. & Wanchoo, K.N., Hidayatullah, M. & Gupta, K.C. Das, Shah, J.C. & Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala decided on:

In this case, two issues were raised whether the State Trading Corporation can be considered a citizen of India within the meaning of Article 19 of the Constitution and can ask for enforcement of fundamental rights granted under the said article. Secondly, whether a corporation can claim to enforce fundamental rights under part III of the Constitution against the state as defined in Article 12.

These two issues were answered in negative.

Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (1966).

The 9-judge bench consisting of Gajendragadkar, P.B. (Cj), Sarkar, A.K. & Wanchoo, K.N., Hidayatullah, M. & Shah, J.C., Mudholkar, J.R. & Sikri, S.M., Bachawat, R.S. & Ramaswami, V. decided on:

In a defamation case instituted against publisher of English Weekly “Blitz” Judge made oral Order forbidding publication of evidence of a witness – such Order was passed to prevent witness from risk of excessive publicity – aggrieved by said Order petitioners who were reporters filed writ petition before High Court which was dismissed on ground that impugned Order was judicial Order of High Court and was not amenable to writ under Article 226 – petitioners then moved Supreme Court under Article 32 for enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 19 (1) (a) and (g) of Constitution.

judicial Orders of High Court are not amenable to be corrected by Supreme Court by issuing writ of certiorari – petition dismissed.

Supritendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta (1966).

The 9-judge bench consisting of Rao, K. Subba (Cj), Wanchoo, K.N. & Shah, J.C., Sikri, S.M. & Bachawat, R.S., Ramaswami, V. & Shelat, J.M., Bhargava, Vishishtha & Vaidyialingam, C.A. decided on:

The bench considered whether the State of West Bengal, when it was carrying on a trade, as owner and occupier of the market at Calcutta, without obtaining the license was bound by the Calcutta Municipality Act or by necessary implication was exempted to obtain the license. The court held that an enactment applies to citizens as well as to the State unless it expressly or by necessary implication exempts the State from its operation, steers clear of all the anomalies and is consistent with the philosophy of equality enshrined in the Constitution.

“The State cannot claim the exemption to obtain a license on the ground that the Calcutta Municipal Act does not expressly or by necessary implication to make it binding on the State.”

The Ahmedabad St. Xavier College v. State of Gujurat (1974)

The 9-judge bench consisting of Ray, A.N. (Cj), Reddy, P.J. & Palekar, D.G., Khanna, Hans Raj Mathew, K.K., Beg, M. H. Dwivedi, S.N., Chandrachud, Y.V. & Alagiriswami, A. decided on:

Minority institutions which were in truth and reality educational institutions, where education in its various aspects was imparted, claimed protection of Article 30 – Hence, this Appeal – Whether, minorities based on religion or language had right to establish and administer educational institutions for imparting general secular education within meaning of Article 30 – Held, minorities were given this protection under Article 30 in order to preserve, and strengthen integrity and unity of country – Thus, sphere of general secular education was intended to develop commonness of boys and girls of our country – If religious or linguistic minorities were not given protection under Article 30 to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, they would feel isolated and separate.

Indira Sawhney v. UOI (1992).

The 9-judge bench consisting of M.H. Kania, C.J., M.N. Venkatachaliah, S.R. Pandian, T.K. Thommen, A.M. Ahmadi, Kuldip Singh, P.B. Sawant, R.M. Sahai B.P. Jeevan Reddy, JJ.

This case is famously known as the ‘Mandal Commission case’. This case is related to reservation. It was stated in the case that reservation class must be backward and not adequately represented in services under the state. Identification of Backward classes is subject to judicial review. Total reservations shall not exceed 50%. Reservation cannot be extended for matters of promotion. The vacancies reserved can be carried forward for a maximum period of three years. Creamy layer amongst the backward class of citizens to be excluded by fixation on proper income or status.

SCARA v. UOI (2^nd Judges Case) (1993).

The 9-judge bench consisting of Pandian, S.R. (J), Ahmadi, A.M. (J) (J), Verma, Jagdish Saran Punchhi, M.M., Yogeshwar Dayal Ray, G.N. (J), Anand, A.S. (J) (J)

In this case, the court decided by 7-2 on the issue of appointment of Judges. Before this case, SP Gupta v. UOI gave supremacy to the executive in appointment of judges. This case overruled the first judges case. For the first time, collegium for appointment of judges was given preference. In collegium, there can be two most senior senior judges along with CJI to decide upon appointment of judiciary. The court interpreted Article 124 and 217 to give more independence to the judiciary.

The court referred the statement of Bhagwati, J. in first judges case”

“This is the principle of independence of the judiciary which is vital for the establishment of real participatory democracy, maintenance of the rule of law as a dynamic concept and delivery of social justice to the vulnerable sections of the community. It is this principle of independence of the judiciary which we must keep in mind while interpreting the relevant provisions of the Constitution.“

S.R. Bommai v. UOI (1994).

The 9-judge bench consisting of Pandian, S.R. (J), Ahmadi, A.M. (J) (J), Verma, J.S. (J) Sawant, P.B., Ramaswamy, K. & Agrawal, S.C. (J), Yogeshwar Dayal Reddy, B.P. (J)

This case is related to proclamation of president rule in states. In 1989, Karnataka Government was dismissed, as this was common trend that any party opposite to Union misuse this power of proclamation of emergency. This was challenged by S.R. Bommai, the then CM of Karnataka. He approached Karnataka HC where his Writ Petition was dismissed. Then, he approached to supreme court where the question was raised “whether imposition of president’s rule is challengeable?” What is ground and extend of president’s rule in a state.

The court held that proclamation of imposition of Art. 356 is subject to Judicial review and the power of president to impose A. 356 to dismiss state government is not absolute. The proclamation of emergency require approval of both the houses. In case of non-approval, the legislative assembly will revive. Till the time of approval, president can only suspend the assembly.

“The Indian Constitution is both a legal and social document. It provides a machinery for the governance of the country. It also contains the ideals expected by the nation. The political machinery created by the Constitution is a means to the achieving of this ideal.”

Attorney General of India v. Amrit Lal Prajivandas (1994).

The 9-judge bench consisting of Ahmadi, A.M. (J), Sawant, P.B. & Ramaswamy, K., Reddy, K.J. (J) Agrawal, S.C. (J), Mohan, S. (J) Reddy, B.P. (J), Ray, G.N. (J) (J)

In this case, Parliament have passed two laws for prevention of smuggling activities and conservation of forest exchange. The laws are COFEPOSA and SAFEMA. The challenge was made on the ground of legislative competence, whether detention can be made during emergency? whether detentions of emergency can be challenged now?

The court held that COFEPOSA is a validly made law. The detention made under law is valid and if a detenue want to challenge his detention during emergency he can do so, but the challenge must be confined to the grounds which were open to him during the period of emergency.

Mafat Lal Industries v. UOI (1996).

The 9-judge bench consisting of Ahmadi A.M. (Cj), Verma, J.S. (J) Agrawal, S.C. (J), Jeevan Reddy, B.P. (J) Anand, A.S. (J), Hansaria B.L. Sen, S.C. (J), Paripoornan, K.S.(J) & (J)

In this case, court determines the right and liability of the citizen against the state for the unlawful levy of taxes by the state. The case deals with the issue of refund for unlawful levy of taxes.

New Delhi Municipal Corporation v. State of Punjab (1996).

The 9-judge bench consisting of Ahmadi A.M. (Cj), Verma, J.S. (J) Agrawal, S.C. (J), Jeevan Reddy, B.P. (J) Anand, A.S. (J), Hansaria B.L. Sen, S.C. (J), Paripoornan, K.S.(J) & (J)

“The property taxes levied by and under the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, the New Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 and the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 constitute “Union taxation” within the meaning of clause (1) of Article 289 of the Constitution of India. “

“The levy of property taxes under the aforesaid enactments on lands and/or buildings belonging to the State governments is invalid and incompetent by virtue of the mandate contained in clause (1) of Article 289. However, if any land or building is used or occupied for the purposes of any trade or business – trade or business as explained in the body of this judgment – carried on by or on behalf of the State government, such land or building shall be subject to levy of property taxes levied by the said enactments.“

Re Special Reference (1998) (3^rd Judges Case).

The 9-judge bench consisting of S Bharucha, M Mukherjee, S Majmudar, S V Manohar, G Nanavati, S S Ahmad, K Venkataswami, B Kirpal, G Pattanaik.

This case is famously known as third judges case, In this case the President referred the issue of collegium before Supreme Court advisory jurisdiction. The question was whether in collegium, the decision of the CJI is superior. The court answered that the consultation should be in a single form with consensus of whole collegium. This case extended the size of collegium from 3 to 5. 4 senior most judges plus CJI.

I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007).

The 9-judge bench consisting of CJI Y.K. Sabharwal, and Justices Ashok Bhan, Arijit Pasayat, B.P. Singh, S.H. Kapadia, C.K. Thakker, P.K. Balasubramanyan, Altamas Kabir, D.K. Jain 

This case is famously known as 9th Schedule case because of the issues involved. By virtue of 9th schedule, law were exempted from judicial review. The court upheld that the law which violates the part III of the constitution is liable to struck down. The reference of landmark judgment of Keshavananda Bharti is very crucial in this case. This case revisit the concept of basic structure from perspective of 9th schedule. The court held that any law inserted under 9th schedule is not completely immune. It is fictionally immune as it has to satisfy the basic structure doctrine. The court also emphasized the right’s test in this case.

Jindal Stainless Steel v. State of Haryana (2016).

The 9-judge bench consisting of CJI T.S. Thakur and Justices AK Sikri, SA Bobde, S A Singh, NV Ramana, R. Bhanumathi, Khanwilkar, Ashok Bhushan, DY Chandrachud.

The bench held that entry tax is valid in inter-state export of goods. It was held to be valid as it does not impact the Article 301 which states ‘free’ trade and commerce between state. The court held that free does not means free from taxes.

“Levy of taxes is an attribute of a sovereign State as per Constitutional scheme and limited to the extent as provided in the Constitution.”

K.S. Puttaswamy v. UOI (2017).

The 9-judge bench consisting of CJI J S Kehar, Justices Chelameshwar, S A Bobde, R K Agarwal, R F Nariman, A M Sapre, D Y Chandrachud, S K Kaul and Abdul Nazeer.

This case is also known as Aadhar Case. In this case, court held that right to privacy is part of fundamental right under Article 21 of the constitution. It overrule the M.P Sharma and Kharak Singh judgments were court held that there is no right to privacy guaranteed by the constitution.

“There is no antinomy between the right to privacy and the legitimate goals of the State. An invasion of privacy has to be proportional to and carefully tailored for achieving a legitimate aim. While the right to food is an important right and its promotion is a constitutional obligation of the State, yet the right to privacy cannot simply and automatically yield to it.”

Kantaru Rajeevaru vs Indian Young Lawyers Association 

The 9-judge bench consisting of CJI S.A. Bobde, R. Banumathi, Ashok Bhushan, L. Nageshwara Rao, Mohan M. Shatanagoudar, S. Abdul Nazeer, R. Subash Reddy, B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant.

This case is the review petition on the question of law decided by 5-judge bench in Indian Young Lawyer Association v. State of Kerala. Where court held that devotees of Lord Ayyappa did not constitute separate religious denomination and therefore could not claim benefit of Article 26 of the Constitution. Further, exclusion of women between ages of ten to fifty years from entry into temple was violative of Article 25 of the Constitution of India.

These are all the 9-judge bench decision passed by the Supreme court till now. We will constantly be improving and updating the blog as soon as new content comes our way. It is important to note that in this blog we only dealt with the judgment passed by 9-judge bench. We have not seen the decision passed by bench greater then 9-judge bench. However, in some other article we will deal with that aspect.

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9-judge bench landmark decision, 9-judge bench 16 important judgments.