Case Title: Anjum Kadari & Anr. v. UOI & Ors., 2024 INSC 831. (Madarsa Case)

Bench

CJI Dr. DY Chandrachud, J. JB Pardiwala and J. Manoj Mishra.

Introduction

Anjum Kadari v. UOI is a crucial case on the constitutional validity of education imparted by Madarsas. The judgment delves into the validity of Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 on grounds of Secularism, violations of Article 14 and 21A. It is a commendable judgment as it analyses two important areas and their interplay i.e. religion and education. This judgment also answers important questions such as the application of doctrine of basic structure on ordinary legislation, legislative competence pertaining to concurrent list, important principle of secularism, etc.

Facts

The Allahabad High Court declared UP Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates the principles of Secularism and Article 14, 21 and 21A of the Constitution of India(COI) and Section 22 of the UGC Act. The entire Act has been struck down by the High Court. The issue pertaining to Functions of Board under Sec. 9 of Madarsa Act was under challenge and the object and purpose of the Act. The HC stated that the object and purpose of the Madarsa Act itself violated the principle of secularism, and thus, it is not possible to segregate or save any portion of the legislation.

Special leave petitions were instituted by the appellant before the Supreme Court assailing the correctness of the impugned judgment. The SC stayed the implementation of the impugned judgment and hear reasons for interim direction. Now, the issue of this court is to determine the correctness of decision of the High Court of Allahabad. ¶1 to 31

Issue

Whether the decision taken by the Allahabad HC to declare the whole Act unconstitutional on grounds of Secularism, violation of Article 14, 21 and 21A of COI and Section 22 of UGC Act is valid or not?

Submissions

From appellant side and favouring Madarasa Act, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mr. Salman Khurshid, and Dr Menaka Guruswamy submitted their arguments¶32:

• State legislation under Article 246 read with Entry 25 List III empowered to regulate Madarsa education.
• In SR Bommai v. UOI, it was held that secularism is a positive concept of equal treatment of all religions.
• Article 28 does not bar state from funding schools providing religious education.
• Sec. 1(5) of the RTE Act excludes Madarsas from the purview of the legislation.
• Striking down the legislation will create legislative vacuum.

KM Natraj, representing State of UP, stated that some provision may be unconstitutional. High Court erred in striking down the entire Madaras Act without severing the invalid provisions from the rest of Madarsa Act.¶33

Against Madarsa Act, following submissions were made:

It does not impart secular subjects as part of the curriculum. Entry 25 List III is subject to Entry 66 List I which pertains to higher education and standards. Article 28 provides that institutions which receive funds from the state cannot impart religious instructions. Madarsa Act deprives students from benefits of mainstream, holistic, secular education, thereby violating Article 21 and 21A. It creates two classes of children and also violates constitutional value of fraternity. ¶34&35

Judgment

The entire Madarsa Act need not be struck down, the doctrine of severability should be applied.  The Madarsa Act does not violate basic structure doctrine as for violation, specific provisions from the Constitution is to be shown violated. Further, Madarsa Act is a regulatory legislation which seeks to provide standards for quality education. Also, it is within legislative competence of the state under Entry 25, List III of the Constitution.

Reason Stated

On Secularism

The court examined the secularism present in our constitution. Secularism is one of the facets of right to equality.[1] As a corollary, the equality code prohibits the State from mixing religion with any secular activity of the State. However, the equal treatment of persons is illusionary unless the State takes active steps in that regard. Therefore, there are some positive obligations on the State to provide equal treatment to all persons irrespective of their religion, faith, or beliefs. Article 25 to 30 contain the other facet of secularism, that is, the practice of religious tolerance by the State. ¶40-42

Article 28 does not prohibit the State from granting recognition to educational institutions imparting religious instruction in addition to secular education. ¶43

On application of basic structure doctrine on Ordinary legislation

In SR Bommai v. UOI, the SC held that Secularism is a basic feature of the Constitution. In India Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, Chief Justice AN Ray held that the constitutional validity of a statute depends entirely on the existence of the legislative power and the express provision in Article 13. Since the legislation is not subject to any other constitutional limitation, applying the basic structure doctrine to test the validity of a statute will amount to “rewriting the constitution”.

J. YV Chandrachud also stated that Constitutional amendments and ordinary legislation operates in different fields and are subject to different limitations. However, in the dissenting opinion then Chief Justice MH Beg stated basic structure doctrine can be used to test constitutional validity of the legislation. ¶49,50

In Madaras Bar Association v. UOI, J. JS Khehar held that the basic structure of the Constitution will stand violated if Parliament does not ensure that the newly created tribunals do not “conform with the salient characteristics and standards of the court sought to be substituted.” ¶52

Generally, the validity of statute cannot be challenged on violation of basic structure doctrine. Since, the concepts of democracy, federalism and secularism are undefined. However, the Supreme Court has accepted that a challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute for violation of the basic structure is a technical aspect because the infraction has to be traced to the express provision of the Constitution. Hence, in a challenge to the validity of a statute for violation of the principle of secularism, it must be shown that the statute violates provisions of the Constitution pertaining to secularism. ¶54, 55

On recognition of minority educational institution

In re Kerala Education Bill 1957, the court classified minority institutions into three categories. First, those which take no aid from the state. Second, those which take aid from the state and third those which only take recognition but no aid. ¶57

In PA Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, the court held the two overriding conditions for granting recognition to a minority educational institution. The two conditions are: 1) Recognition is not denied solely on the ground of the educational institution being one belonging to minority. 2) the regulation is neither aimed at nor has the effect of depriving the institution of its minority status. ¶60

The aim of affiliation or recognition is to maintain the a standard of education which is decent for securing work outside or to make that skill monetizable. In Ahmedabad St Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat, Chief Justice AN Ray held that minority educational institutions have no fundamental right to recognition. The primary purpose of recognition is to ensure that the student have “qualifications in the shape of degrees necessary for a useful career in life.” ¶61

On Madarsa Act

The Supreme Court stated that Madarsa Act is for maintaining standards and quality of education in Madarsas. It is a regulatory legislation. The state has power to regulated the administration of minority educational institutions. However, no power to completely take over the management of such institutions by superseding or dissolving their management.[2]

Regulations does not directly interfere the administration of the recognize Madarsas. The Madarsa Act do not directly interfere with day to day administration. It is positive concept of secularism to take active steps to treat minority institutions on par with secular institutions while allowing them to retain their minority character. ¶69, 70.

The Madarsa Act furthers the substantive equality as held in Joseph Shine v. UOI. Substantive equality promotes affirmative actions or state support. Therefore, HC erred in holding the Act violative of basic structure without tracing the exact provision in the Constitution.

RTE Act and Article 30

The SC in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. UOI, decided the conflict between article 30 and Article 21-A. The court held that RTE Act is ultra vires to the extent it applied to minority educational institutions. ¶76

On legislative competence

The regulation of minority institutions falls within the ambit of Entry 25, List III. There is no other legislation made by the Parliament on the similar subject. The RTE Act specifically express it is inapplicable on Madarsas. Also, there is no jurisprudential basis to read Entry 25, List III to be limited to only education that is devoid of any religious teaching or instruction. It cannot be said that the entire Madarsa Act is beyond legislative competence. ¶87, 90

In Prof. Yashpal v. State of Chattisgarh, it was stated that the provisions of state legislation in conflict with provisions of the UGC Act are unconstitutional. Therefore, the Madarsa Act to the extend it seeks to regulate higher education, including degrees of Fazil and Kamil, is beyond the legislative competence. ¶94-99

Conclusion

 The Judgment categorically recognizes the right of children studying in Madarsas. It delves on some serious constitutional principles such as application of basic structure doctrine on ordinary legislation, the concept of secularism, legislative competence, nature of Madarsa Act and Right to education. Every issue is dealt in great detail and pragmatism. It seeks to promote education provided in minority education and confirms that no student is affected by the order of High Court. This decision clarifies the idea of secularism and its understanding relating it to constitutional provisions. Lastly, separating the invalid part which conflicts with UGC Act was better as whole Act can remain the same without presence of that invalid part.

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[1] Dr M Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360.

[2] Bihar State Madarsa Education Board v. Madarsa Hanifa Arabic College, (1990) 1 SCC 428.