Introduction to General Exceptions

The Indian Penal Code (IPC), enacted in 1860, serves as the primary criminal code of India, defining and penalizing various offenses. However, within its framework, the IPC also incorporates certain provisions known as “General Exceptions.” These exceptions provide a legal escape route for individuals who commit acts that would otherwise be considered offenses, under specific circumstances.

Article 361 of Constitution of India grants protection to President of India, Governor of State, or Rajpramukh. They are not answerable to any court for the matters pertaining to exercise of the powers and duties of their office.

In this article, we will explore the significant general exceptions under the IPC, understanding the principles that guide them and their implications in the Indian criminal justice system.

Kinds of General Exception

There are two kinds of general exceptions. First, the exceptions which are excusable and second, the exception which are justifiable. The former is for certain class of person whereas the latter is justifiable under certain circumstances.

Burden of Proof that case fall within general exceptions

The burden of proof is on accused to show that his case falls within one of the general exceptions as it is stated by section 105 of Indian Evidence Act. In such cases, court cannot suo motu presume the existence of the circumstances.

Standard of Proof for general exceptions

Accused have to prove in similar ways as prosecution proves its case. He can prove in two ways:

1. By giving positive and direct evidence
2. By creating doubt in prosecution story

Plea for general exception

Accused do not have any imperative duty or obligation to take up specific plea that his case falls under any of the general exception because of section 6 of IPC that enables the court to read the provisions of IPC along with general exceptions.

Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law (Sec. 76 and 79).

Mistake of Fact (Section 76 and 79) and Mistake of Law are critical general exceptions under the IPC. Mistake of Fact occurs when an individual, acting under a genuine belief of facts, commits an act that would otherwise be an offense. On the other hand, Mistake of Law arises when someone commits an act, believing it to be lawful, but it turns out to be an offense.

In general, Mistake of Fact provides a valid defense, while Mistake of Law is not considered an excuse for criminal liability, as ignorance of the law is not accepted as a defense. It is based on the maxim “Ignorantia facti doth excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat”.

Section 76: Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law.—
Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it.

Illustrations
(a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in conformity with the commands of the law. A has committed no offence.
(b) A, an officer of a Court of Justice, being ordered by that Court to arrest Y, and after due enquiry, believing Z to be Y, arrests Z. A has committed no offence.

After reading sec. 76 of IPC, we get to know three important extenuating factors for the general exceptions of Mistake of Fact are:

1. That the state of things believed to exist would, if true, have justified the act done;
2. that the mistake must be reasonable; and
3. the mistake must relate to fact and not to law.

Complete unawareness of situation

Ignorance of fact shows that there is no presence of mens rea. However, it is important to note that mistake must be related to the material facts constituting offence. He must be completely unknown of the real circumstances of the offence which makes his act an offence.

Bound by Law

Illustration (a) of sec. 76 shows that a person bound by law, acting under the mistaken belief of fact, is given protection under section 76. Now, this situation shows that the person must be bound by law, which means that he must be legally entitled to do something that he does not perform, making his act illegal.

A person, who was charged the kidnapping of a minor girl, pleaded that he did so at the request of the girl’s mother, his defence was not accepted as he was not bound by law to obey the orders of mother to take the girl away.

Act done under Order of Superior Authority

Every order of superior does not get the legal protection under section 76 of the IPC. The order must be legally valid. In Dakhi Singh v. State, the accused arrested the deceased who was suspected of being a thief, and the deceased resisted the arrest. The accused used force which resulted in his death. Section 46 of CrPC gives police officer can use all necessary means to effect arrest. The court held that deceased was only suspected of theft, section 76 and 79 of IPC, did not justify the person dead.

Sec. 79: Justified by Law

Sec. 79 Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing himself, justified, by law. —
Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it.

Illustration
A sees Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A, in the exercise, to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith, of the power which the law gives to all persons of apprehending murderers in the fact, seizes Z, in order to bring Z before the proper authorities. A has committed no offence, though it may turn out that Z was acting in self-defence.

Section 79 protects act which are justified by law or are bona fide believed, by mistake of fact, to be justified by law. This can be understood by case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Venugopal, the accused were all policeman, they arrested a person on the suspicion of receiver of stolen property and entered house by breaking it. Three days after arrest, arrested person was found dead. The accused were charged with offences under section 348, 331 and 201 of IPC.

The trial court convicted the accused. Later, HC ordered whatever police did was justified. The state made challenge in Supreme Court, where it observed:

“To be able to say that an act is done ‘under’ a provision of law, one must discover the existence of reasonable apprehension between the provisions and the act. The High Court fell into the error of thinking that whatever a police officer does to a person suspected of a crime at a time when the officer is engaged in investigation that crime should be held to be done in discharge of his official duties to investigate and as such under the provisions of the law that imposed this duty on him. This view is wholly unwarranted in law.”

Essential element to avail general exceptions under sec. 76 and 79

It is essential to act in good faith to avail the defence of Mistake of Fact. Section 52 of IPC defines the term good faith.

Section 52 : “Good faith”.—Nothing is said to be done or believed in “good faith” which is done or believed without due care and attention.

So due care and attention is important to avail the defence. The court will decide in each case according to the facts and circumstances whether there is good faith or not. It also does not mean that a person should be of high moral standard, but it means that he must perform the given act with due care and attention what he is assigned to do.

In Harbajan Singh v. State of Punjab, the court held that the accused who was convicted under sec. 500 of IPC, for allegedly defaming S Surinder Singh Kairon, son of S Pratap Singh Kairon, Chief Minister of Punjab. He published that CM’s son is indulged in various criminal activities in Punjab. The Supreme Court find that accused acted in good faith (9th Exception of Sec. 499 of IPC). He conducted all the research before publishing the statement. Therefore, court held that accused acted in good faith.

We can understand from the above case law that due inquiry was made by the accused before publishing the statement made in good faith. However, if someone publishes something without reason and inquiry based on certain rumors, they cannot avail the defense under sec. 79.

Judicial Acts (Section 77 and 78)

Sec. 77. Act of Judge when acting judicially. —Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.

Sec. 78. Act done pursuant to the judgment or order of Court.—Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or which is warranted by the judgment or order of, a Court of Justice; if done whilst such judgment or order remains in force, is an offence, notwithstanding the Court may have had no jurisdiction to pass such judgment or order, provided the person doing the act in good faith believes that the Court had such jurisdiction.

Section 19 “Judge”.—The word “Judge” denotes not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person.
who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or
a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive, or
who is one of a body or persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment.

Illustrations
(a) A Collector exercising jurisdiction in a suit under Act 10 of 1859, is a Judge.
(b) A Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in respect of a charge on which he has power to sentence to fine or imprisonment, with or without appear, is a Judge.
(c) A member of a panchayat which has power, under 4Regulation VII, 1816, of the Madras Code, to try and determine suits, suits, is a Judge.
(d) A Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in respect of a charge on which he has power only to commit for trial to another Court, is not a Judge.

So, sec. 19 makes its apparently clear that judges does not only include formal positions in courts but also includes person who are entitled to order same orders.

Section 77 of the IPC grants immunity to judges for acting judicially in the exercise of any power done in good faith which he believes to be given by law. This protection is essential to ensure the proper functioning of the judiciary and prevent malicious prosecution against those involved in the legal process.

Section 78 grant immunity to those persons who act in pursuant to the judgment or order of court.

Accident and Misfortune (Section 80 and 81)

Section 80. Accident in doing a lawful act.—Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune, and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution.

Section 81. Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent other harm.— Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property.

Explanation. —It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm.

Without any criminal intention or Knowledge

The important element of both the section is absence of criminal intent or knowledge. It means that person acting must be without mens rea or guilty mind. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rangaswamy, the accused fired from a distance of 152 feet. He found at his surprise that he shot a human being. The accused state he had seen Hyena previous day. At the time of shooting, it was raining so he was not able to see or expect a person there.

Maxim for General exceptions of Accident

There are two maxims supporting this principle: quo necessitas non habet leegem (necessity know no law) and necessitas vincit legem (necessity overcomes the law).

Doctrine of Necessity

Doctrine of Necessity is important aspect of sec. 81 of IPC. To avoid the greater evil, the person has to commit smaller evil. Illustration (a) and (b) of section 81 explains this doctrine of necessity.

Whether doctrine of necessity justifies the murder of a person

This question is answered in case of R v. Dudley and Stephens, four persons were lost in sea due to storm. They are left with no food and everyone was starving to death. Dudely and Stephens decided to kill the cabin boy who was likely to die first among them. They eat the flesh of cabin boy and drank his blood. Four days later, they were rescued. They faced trial for killing the boy. The court held them guilty of murder of cabin boy.

The principles that can be deduced from the Dudley and Stephens are:

1. Self-preservation is not an absolute necessity;
2. no person has a right to take another’s life to preserve his own, and
3. there is no necessity that justifies homicide.

Infancy (Section 82 and 83)

Section 82 Act of a child under seven years of age.—Nothing is an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age.

Section 83 Act of a child above seven and under twelve of immature understanding.—Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion.

Section 82 of the IPC deals with the criminal liability of children. Children below the age of seven are considered legally incapable of committing any crime. It is based on the maxim doli incapax. Law presumes that child below 7 years of age cannot possess the requisite mens rea for committing offence.

Maturity of Understanding

Section 83 provides that children between the ages of seven and twelve, it is presumed that they lack the maturity to understand the nature and consequences of their actions, unless it can be proven otherwise. This principle is based on the understanding that children are not fully capable of forming criminal intent.

Protection under Juvenile Justice Act

Apart from protection under Section 82 and 83 of IPC, the JJ Act is a comprehensive legislation that protects children from serious punishment. It covers children who have not yet reached the age of 18. The Act does not provide complete immunity, however, it is child welfare legislation to protect the interest of the children. The children won’t be punished with death sentence or imprisonment for life without possibility of release.

Determination of Age accused under JJ Act

In Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, the five-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the age during the date of commission of the offense would be considered as the age for the application of the JJ Act to the accused and not the age which is during the time he is presented before competent authority or court.

Insanity (Section 84)

Section 84 Act of a person of unsound mind.— Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.

Legal Maxims for Insanity

1. actus non facit reum nisi mens rea: Nothing is an offence where there is no mens rea
2. Furiosis nulla voluntas est: a mad man has no will
3. furiosus absentis low est: He is like one who is absent
4. furiosus furore sui puniter: A mad man is punished by his own madness.

Emergence of insanity as General exceptions

The foundation of defence of insanity was laid down by House of Lords in 1843, which is popularly known as M’Naghten case. The accused by the name of Daniel M’Naghten suffered from a delusion that Sir Robert Peel, the then Prime Minister of Britain had injured him. He mistook Edward Drummond, Secretary to the PM. He shot and killed him. The accused took the plea of insanity. The medical examination clarified that he was suffering from morbid delusion which carried him away beyond the power of his own control.

He was held not guilty by reason of insanity. His acquittal brought a lot of public criticism. Therefore, House of Lords for clarification enunciated the following principles for this defence of insanity:

(1) Every person is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crime, until the contrary is established.

(2) To establish the defence of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the crime, the person was so insane as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.

(3) The test of wrongfulness of the act is in the power to distinguish between right and wrong, not in the abstract or in general, but in regard to the particular act committed.

Section 84 of the IPC deals with the concept of insanity as a defense and is also based on the principle laid down in M’Naghten Case. When a person commits a criminal act but is proven to have been of unsound mind at the time, they cannot be held criminally liable. It is crucial to recognize the difference between mental illness and legal insanity. Every person suffering from mental illness is not ipso facto exempted from criminal liability.

Legal insanity, in this context, refers to a state where the individual lacked the capacity to understand the nature and consequences of their actions. To establish the defense of insanity, expert psychiatric testimony and evidence are often required, making it a complex and challenging aspect of criminal law.

Kinds of Insanity

IPC does not define any specific kind of insanity which is exempted from punishment. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, Law groups insanity into two broad heads, namely: (a) Dementia Naturalis, i.e., individuals who are insane from birth, and (b) Dementia adventitia or accidentialis, i.e., and individual who becomes insane after his birth.

Intoxication (Section 85, 86)

Section 85. Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will.— Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law: provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.

Section 86. Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated.— In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.

Intoxication can be a complex issue when it comes to criminal liability. Voluntary intoxication is generally not considered a valid defense for criminal acts, as individuals are responsible for their actions even when under the influence of substances. However, in cases of involuntary intoxication, where substances are administered without the person’s knowledge or against their will, it may serve as a valid defense under certain circumstances.

In Bablu @Mabarik Hussain v. State of Rajasthan, the appellant, under the influence of alcohol killed his wife and five children, the supreme court ruled that the mere proof of intoxication is not enough to invoke section 85. The accused needs to prove that intoxication is against his will or without his knowledge.

In Basdev v. Pepsu, the court held that where insanity is caused by voluntary intoxication for a long period of time. Then, it can be justified as a valid defence. The general exceptions of insanity and intoxication, both work on similar grounds, that the person is unable to use his mental faculty.

Consent (Section 87-93)

Consent, as a general exception, provides a valid defense in certain situations. For instance, in cases of minor injuries or acts that may be deemed offenses, if the act was done with the consent of the affected party, it may not be considered an offense. However, it is essential to note that the consent must be given voluntarily and not obtained through coercion, deceit, or misrepresentation.

Section 90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.— A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or

Consent of insane person.— if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or

Consent of child.— unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.

Consent of the Victim (Section 90)

Section 90 of IPC defines consent in negative connotation, any consent given under fear of injury or misconception of fact or insanity or immaturity due to childhood does not amount to valid consent.

Consent as general exceptions

The principle of consent is place under chapter of general exceptions because it is presumed that the person will always think of his advantage in right circumstances. No man would like to harm himself and they would think of their best interest better than any judge, jury or other person.

Intentional death or grievous hurt with consent

Section 87. Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done by consent.—

Nothing which is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and which is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, to any person, above eighteen years of age, who has given consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm; or by reason of any harm which it may be known by the doer to be likely to cause to any such person who has consented to take the risk of that harm.

Illustration

A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement. This agreement implies the consent of each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such fencing, may be caused without foul play; and if A, while playing fairly, hurts Z, A commits no offence.

For application of this section, it is important that there should be absence of any intention of causing death or grievous hurt to the person giving consent. Illustration to section 87 also make it apparently clear that, without intention to cause hurt, there cannot be any offence. As it is an important principle of criminal offence that mens rea should be there. Also, the section mentions that consent should be given by persons above 18 years of age.

Protection given to a doctor for treating a patient with consent and in good faith

Section 88. Act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person’s benefit.— Nothing, which is not intended to cause death, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause, to any person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm.

Illustration

A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z, who suffers under the painful complaint, but not intending to cause Z’s death, and intending, in good faith, Z’s benefit, performs that operation on Z, with Z’s consent. A has committed no offence.

Section 89. Act done in good faith for benefit of child or insane person, by or by consent of guardian.— Nothing which is done in good faith for the benefit of a person under twelve years of age, or of unsound mind, by or by consent, either express or implied, of the guardian or other person having lawful charge of that person, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause or be known by the doer to be likely to cause to that person: Provided—

Provisos.

First.—That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death;

Secondly.—That this exception shall not extend to the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;

Thirdly.—That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of grievous hurt, or to the attempting to cause grievous hurt, unless it be for the purpose of preventing death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;

Fourthly.—That this exception shall not extend to the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend. Illustration A, in good faith, for his child’s benefit without his child’s consent, has his child cut for the stone by a surgeon knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause the child’s death, but not intending to cause the child’s death. A is within the exception, inasmuch as his object was the cure of the child.

Act done without consent and in good faith

Section 92 provides that an act done in good faith done without consent does not constitute offence. If the circumstances are such that it is impossible too signify consent or person is incapable of giving consent. However, this section does not exceeds to causing intentional causing of death, or the attempting to cause death or anything which is likely to cause death except the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity. The person neither cause hurt intentionally or abetment of any offence.

Where consent does not absolve a doer

Section 91. Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm cause.—The exceptions in sections 87, 88 and 89 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to be likely to cause, to the person giving the consent, or on whose behalf the consent is given.

Illustration

Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman) is offence independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended to cause to the woman. Therefore, it is not an offence “by reason of such harm”; and the consent of the woman or of her guardian to the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act.

Communication made in Good Faith for Benefit

Section 93. Communication made in good faith.—No communication made in good faith is an offence by reason of any harm to the person to whom it is made, if it is made for the benefit of that person.

Illustration

A, a surgeon, in good faith, communicates to a patient his opinion that he cannot live. The patient dies in consequence of the shock. A has committed no offence, though he knew it to be likely that the communication might cause the patient’s death.

Compulsion (Section 94)

Section 94. Act to which a person is compelled by threats.—Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise be the consequence: Provided the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint.

Explanation 1.—A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of this exception, on the ground of his having been compelled by his associates to do anything that is an offence by law.

Explanation 2.—A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of this exception.

Trivial Acts (Section 95)

Section 95. Act causing slight harm.—Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.

Legal Maxim

De minimis non curat lex- the law does not concern itself with trifles.

Object of the section as general exceptions

Trivial acts have been placed in general exceptions as in daily life we get to indulge in a lot of activities and human interaction where certain minor level of offense is committed on a daily basis. For example, if you’re walking in a crowd and you suddenly get hit by the crowd, you will obviously get hurt, but this is no reason to take criminal action against the person. It is normal to have clashes while walking in a crowd. Some people might accidentally hit your toes. Therefore, the law does not concern itself with all these activities.

Private Defense (Section 96-106)

The right of private defence is absolutely necessary as police will always not be available to safeguard us. It is also not possible to maintain law and order only by giving police rights to protect person’s body as there is no one to have vigilance over us all the time.

Section 96 clearly provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.

Right of Private defence of the body and of property

Section 97 provides that every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 99 to defend his own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body. Also, this right extends to offences against property of himself and any other person for offences against property.

Person must not be an aggressor

It is pertinent to note that the person exercising the rights must not be the aggressor which means that he must not start the fight or quarrel. He can exercise this right when someone is attacking him.

Exceptions of private defence as provided under section 99 of the Act

Section 99. Acts against which there is no right of private defence.—There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act, may not be strictly justifiable by law.

There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that direction may not be strictly justifiable by law.

There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to protection of the public authorities.

Extent to which the right may be exercised.—The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.

Explanation 1.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is such public servant.

Explanation 2.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant, unless he knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states the authority under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces such authority, if demanded

When right of private defence of body extends to causing death

Section 100. When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death.—The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:—

First.—Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault

Secondly.—Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;

Thirdly.—An assault with the intention of committing rape;

Fourthly.—An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;

Fifthly.—An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;

Sixthly.—An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release. 1

[Seventhly.—An act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or administer acid which may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such act.]

When this right does not extends to causing death

Section 101. When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.—If the offence be not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section, the right of private defence of the body does not extend to the voluntary causing of death to the assailant, but does extend, under the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing to the assailant of any harm other than death.

Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of the body

Section 102. Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of the body.—The right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not have been committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues.

When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death

Section 103. When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death.—The right of private defence of property extends, under the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the wrong-doer, if the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right, be an offence of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:—

First.—Robbery;

Secondly.—House-breaking by night;

Thirdly.—Mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or vessel, which building, tent or vessel is used as a human dwelling, or as a place for the custody of property;

Fourthly.—Theft, mischief, or house-trespass, under such circumstances as may reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence, if such right of private defence is not exercised.

When it cannot be extended to death.

Section 104 provides that private defence cannot be extended to death when the offence is not of description mentioned in section 103. However, subject to section 99, he can cause any harm other than death.

Private defence as a risk to an Innocent Person

Section 106. Right of private defence against deadly assault when there is risk of harm to innocent person.—

If in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which reasonably causes the apprehension of death, the defender be so situated that he cannot effectually exercise that right without risk of harm to an innocent person, his right of private defence extends to the running of that risk.

Illustration

A is attacked by a mob who attempts to murder him. He cannot effectually exercise his right of private defence without firing on the mob, and he cannot fire without risk of harming young children who are mingled with the mob. A commits no offence if by so firing he harms any of the children.

The right to private defense, embodied in Sections 96 to 106 of the IPC, is a vital aspect of self-preservation and protection of property. It allows individuals to defend themselves or others from harm or unlawful actions. However, the key principle here is that the force used in private defense should be proportionate to the threat faced. Excessive force beyond what is necessary for defense may not be justified and could lead to criminal liability.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the general exceptions under the IPC are vital safeguards in the Indian criminal justice system. They recognize that certain acts, though technically offenses, may be justified under specific circumstances. By providing these exceptions, the law aims to strike a balance between upholding the rule of law and ensuring fairness and reason in the prosecution of offenses.

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References have been made from the book “PSA Pillai’s Criminal Law” by LexisNexis.

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