Written by Prakhar Singh

Introduction

Article 14 forms the soul of the Indian constitution by guaranteeing “equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”. It was within Draft Article 15 of the 1948 Draft Constitution that eventually became Article 21. The original draft then read, “No person shall be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law, nor shall any person be denied equality before the law or the equal protection of the law within the territory of India.”

This composite provision was taken up by the constituent assembly on December 6^th and 13^th, 1948.  However, the discussions were almost entirely consumed by the first part of the clause, whether “procedure established by law” should be replaced by “due process of law.” The second part, which would later become Article 14, went virtually undiscussed, receiving no targeted commentary or amendment. What emerged from the debate was far from insignificant.

Legislative Supremacy and Judicial Guardianship

The core point of this intense discussion was the tension between two constitutional ideas – legislative supremacy and judicial guardianship. Dr. B.R Ambedkar, when responding to Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava’s amendment proposing the inclusion of “due process,” laid bare the philosophical cross-currents influencing the framers. He said that while federal constitutions empower courts to test laws for their legislative competence, the inclusion of the “due process” mechanism would grant the court a deeper second power to evaluate whether a law was substantively fair or in violation of fundamental principles of individual liberty.

Ambedkar, in his stance, said, “We are placed in two difficult positions. One is to give the judiciary the authority to sit in judgement over the will of the legislature, the second position is that the Legislature ought to be trusted not to make bad laws”. He framed this dilemma as sailing between Scylla and Charybdis, between trusting a possibly errant legislature or surrendering final interpretive authority to unelected judges whose decisions might be driven by conscience or bias.

Although we later incorporated the “due process” principle, the debate highlighted the assembly’s cautious trust in judicial review, while reinforcing the need for a fundamental, textually grounded guarantee of equality. On 3 November 1949, the Drafting Committee, in a letter to the President of the Constituent Assembly, proposed bifurcating Draft Article 15. The latter half, concerning equality before law, was extracted and placed under a newly created Article 14, grouped within the chapter titled “Right to Equality”.

This separation was far more than just cosmetic. It provided two parallel streams of constitutional protections. At first, Article 21, guarding life and liberty from arbitrary deprivation through procedure, and Article 14, securing individuals against arbitrary classification or discrimination by law. By placing “equality” under a distinct heading, the framers delivered a crucial message of its centrality in the constitution and not to look at it as just procedural fairness.

Equality before law and equal protection of law

The final wording of Article 14 incorporated two key principles, equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Though often used interchangeably, they emerge from different legal traditions. “Equality before the law” is a British rule-of-law principle, ensuring that no individual is above the law. “Equal protection of the laws” is derived from the American constitutional tradition, implying that laws must not only apply equally but must protect all persons equally in their effect.

These principles together created a fertile ground for judicial interpretation, one that would soon be shaped by competing tests of classification, arbitrariness, and proportionality.

Building Judicial Doctrines: The Early Search for Structure under Article 14

Once the constitution came into force in 1950, Article 14 stood as a promise deep in aspiration but vague in architecture. With no standards or tests built into the original text, it was the Supreme Court that had to decide what shape had to be given to this open-textured equality clause. The first response of the court was to establish a structural test, one that appeared both formal and logical, “the doctrine of reasonable classification.”

This early phase stretched from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, where the judiciary used this deceptively simple test, a legislative or executive classification would withstand scrutiny under Article 14 if,it was based on an intelligible differentia that distinguished persons or things grouped from others left out, and had a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the law.

The origins of this test can be traced to State of West Bengal v. Anwar AliSarkar (1952), where the Supreme Court struck down a law that allowed selective reference of cases to special courts. Justice S.R. Das raised concerns that the Act lacked intelligible guiding principles, opening the door to arbitrary application. Though the majority could not agree on a clear test, the judgment planted the seeds of classification jurisprudence.

The test was firmly solidified in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (1958),where a Constitution Bench upheld the validity of a law establishing a commission of inquiry into specific business practices. Here, the Court formulated a list of propositions that essentially became the backbone of classification jurisprudence under Article 14. These included the intelligible differentia and rational nexus principles.

However, this test began to show its inefficiencies under pressure. It appeared rigorous on paper, but often allowed unfair discrimination to survive judicial review because there was a reasonable legislative purpose and a loosely connected classification. Courts, bound by self-imposed judicial restraint, rarely questioned the social or economic consequences of such classifications.

Critics argued that this test was blind to the indirect effects caused by facially neutral laws on a certain class of people. Even within the judiciary, concerns were growing. Justice Subba Rao, in his many dissents, warned that equality should not be reduced to a mechanical exercise. He emphasized that equality is not merely about uniform treatment but about fairness in the real world. With this arose the need for a more responsive doctrine, one that could interrogate state power, arbitrariness, and social impact.

The Anti-Arbitrariness Turn and the Rise of Substantive Standards

The reasonable classification test, once the centre of Article 14, started to fray under the pressure of its inadequacies. As the Indian legal tradition grew older and wiser, so did the understanding that equality cannot be codified into simplistic categorization. Judicial unease with doctrinal rigidity on classification was synchronized with a political hour of reckoning, the Emergency of 1975–77, when the boundaries of formal equality were challenged by naked state power. It was against this background that Article 14 commenced a watershed change in jurisprudence, from structure to substance, from classification to reasonableness, and from form to effect.

This shift was inaugurated by the landmark case of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974). Challenging the validity of the petitioner’s abrupt transfer from the post of Chief Secretary to a less significant role, the case asked whether the action, though ostensibly legal, was constitutionally fair. Justice Bhagwati’s concurring opinion redefined the relationship between arbitrariness and equality, famously declaring:

“Equality is the opposite of arbitrariness. Equality and arbitrariness are natural enemies. where an action is arbitrary, it is necessarily understood that it is unequal both in terms of political reasoning and constitutional jurisprudence and is, hence, violative of Article 14.”

This formulation constituted a categorical departure from the previous understanding that Article 14 touched upon discriminatory classification alone. Rather, the Court reaffirmed that arbitrariness in itself would be enough to invoke Article 14 scrutiny, regardless of whether there existed an evident class being differentiated. Through this move, the Court started to formulate a substantive idea of fairness into the very centre of equality jurisprudence.

The doctrine of anti-arbitrariness was consolidated merely four years later in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), a case that would transform the structure of Indian constitutionalism. Maneka Gandhi, who was a journalist, had been refused a passport on unspecified grounds. The challenge posed radical questions regarding executive discretion, freedom, and fairness of procedure. Though the literal problem was under Article 21 (right of life and personal liberty), the Court’s argument drew heavily on Article 14, and connected it inextricably with Articles 19 and 21. This “golden triangle” of rights formed the basis for what is now referred to as procedural due process in Indian law.

The judgment stressed that a law affecting personal liberty must not only be enacted by a competent authority but must also pass the tests of non-arbitrariness, fairness, and reasonableness under Article 14. Justice Bhagwati’s opinion emphasized that Article 14 was no longer confined to classification alone, but had grown into a tool to check procedural injustice, even in cases where no class-based discrimination was evident.

This development had profound implications. It allowed courts to scrutinize state action even in administrative choices that were not legislative. In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981), the Supreme Court ruled that even executive or non-legislative acts have to comply with Article 14. The Court explained that the arbitrariness doctrine was not limited to legislation but applied to all state action, thereby placing constitutional morality into layers of government.

This stage was a turning point expansion of Article 14. It was not just an instrument to analyze legislative classification anymore but became a constitutional prism through which to judge fairness, reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness in all governmental conduct. Even this widened doctrine was still lacking something essential; it was concerned about procedures and motives but frequently gave less attention to the actual-world effect of governmental action, particularly on historically marginalized groups.

It was this lacuna, the necessity of transcending fairness in form to equality of outcome, that prompted Indian courts to evolve still more sophisticated tests, borrowing from comparative constitutionalism, human rights jurisprudence, and an increasing grasp of substantive equality. These would assume forms of proportionality, reasonableness in terms of dignity, and finally, impact analysis, initiating the most progressive era of Article 14 to date.

Proportionality, Substantive Equality, and the Search for the Most Effective Test

As the judiciary enlarged Article 14 from a structural review device to one of substantive fairness, there was a demand for more subtle doctrinal frameworks, that could not just review rationality or fairness, but state action’s actual effects. Proportionality doctrine and the shift towards substantive equality were responses to increasingly nuanced calls, the most sophisticated stage in the development of equality jurisprudence under the Indian Constitution.

The proportionality doctrine found ordered articulation in Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001). The Court, taking assistance from European rights case law, made a distinction between tests for legislative action and administrative discretion. While it kept the reasonable classification test for legislative categorizations, when it came to reviewing administrative action, particularly when fundamental rights were concerned, it adopted the four-part proportionality test:

1. The measure must aim at a legitimate objective.
2. The means employed should be appropriate to accomplish that goal.
3. The measure should be indispensable, i.e., the least restrictive alternative should be selected.
4. Balancing must be done between the seriousness of the goal and the harm incurred.

This formalized test enabled courts to examine both the ends and means of state action, and most importantly, it brought into view disproportionate burdens on individuals. Proportionality was originally limited to administrative law, but its rationale started affecting how courts construed legislative action too, particularly in cases on privacy, autonomy, and dignity.

Even proportionality, however, could not encompass the lived reality of inequality. It was still, in essence, a balancing device, a mechanism to balance state interest and individual rights. What it did not have was a moral and social perspective, one that could perceive how law, seemingly neutral on its face, could perpetuate historical disadvantage or cultural stereotypes. This was filled by the development of substantive equality, based on contextual reasoning, anti-stereotyping, and impact analysis.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (2008) marked a change. In this case, the Court abolished a provision of the Punjab Excise Act making it illegal for women to work at premises serving liquor. The State justified the legislation on protection as well as public morality grounds. The Court dismissed this line of argument, ruling that gender-stereotypical protective legislation fell short of the Article 14 test. It underlined the need to interpret equality in a dynamic sense, taking into account changing gender roles, autonomy, and the ability of individuals to make well-informed choices.

In Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018), which legalized consensual homosexual relationships, the Court went a step further. It refused majoritarian morality and appealed to constitutional morality, dignity, and substantive equality. Justice Chandrachud characterized this clearly as stating that formal equality is not enough where structural discrimination is part of the system. Rather, he called for an impact-centered analysis, which looks at whether a law, irrespective of purpose, creates exclusion or stigmatization.

Similarly, in Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018), the Court invalidated the law of adultery, not simply because it discriminated between women and men on paper, but because it reduced women to objects of their husbands’ property. Substantive equality required that such laws be struck down not only for differential treatment, but for reproducing hierarchical social norms.

These decisions marked a full doctrinal break with the initial classification test. The Court no longer inquired simply if a class was singled out, or if the law aimed at some rational goal. It now inquired-

1. What stereotypes are encoded within this legislation?
2. What is the social effect of this regulation on dignity, autonomy, and inclusion?
3. Does this legislation level disadvantage, or magnify it?

Together, proportionality and substantive equality mark a mature jurisprudence that recognizes the interplay among power, identity, and law. While the classification test was concerned with internal logic, and arbitrariness doctrine with fairness in process, these more recent standards look to the justice of outcomes. They empower courts to identify structural inequality, covert discrimination, and profound social asymmetries, issues that the early tests were unable to address.

Which Test Truly Upholds Article 14 Today? A Constitutional and Practical Appraisal

After over seven decades of doctrinal experimentation, Indian equality jurisprudence has developed a layered landscape, one where no one test is supreme in all contexts. Each method, reasonable classification, anti-arbitrariness, proportionality, and substantive equality, has its strength. They also demonstrate the changing priorities of the Indian judiciary – from order to fairness, from formal logic to lived experience. The key question, though, is not which test has most regularly been applied, but which test does best to safeguard constitutional rights in a society as complex, unequal, and diverse as India’s?

The traditional test of reasonable classification, even if still periodically invoked, is increasingly unsatisfactory as a response to the structural imbalances of Indian society. Its internal consistency makes legislation sail through constitutional scrutiny even when it has regressive or exclusionary impacts. With the age of digital governance, predictive policing, biometric databases, and algorithmic decision-making, the “intelligible” structure of a law is no guarantee that it is inclusive, fair, or right-respecting. It provides form without substance.

The doctrine of anti-arbitrariness, as great as its doctrinal significance is, is afflicted with indeterminacy. Its focus on fairness is most welcome, but it does not provide an analytical angle to examine harms consistently, particularly where constitutional rights overlap. It also has difficulty picking up systemic discrimination, which might appear fair procedurally but lead to long-term exclusion. Furthermore, arbitrariness tends to get watered down in application; what seems arbitrary to one court might seem acceptable to another, eroding consistency in judicial results.

The principle of proportionality is a major advance in constitutional law. It necessitates courts weighing diverse interests, quantifying state objectives against harm to the individual, and finding the least burdensome means of attaining policy ends. It turns judicial review from an on/off switch, constitutional or not, into a graduated evaluation of rights and reasons. But its potential in India is still unrealized. Proportionality has come to be used in administrative cases or chosen cases involving fundamental rights, yet courts are not enthusiastic about applying the same systematic rigor to legislative classifications. Its transformative potential is thus still only partially achieved.

Conversely, the newer doctrine of substantive equality, though still nascent, best reflects the constitutional ideal of justice, dignity, and inclusiveness. Unlike previous tests, it changes the emphasis from the form of the law to the operation of the law in the world. It gives courts the authority to address not only facial neutrality but also indirect discrimination, cultural stereotyping, and institutional disadvantage. It is an experience-born doctrine, acknowledging that centuries of exclusion cannot be remedied by symmetrical legal treatment.

Substantive equality is not without tensions. It asks judges to consider sociological evidence, to interpret the Constitution as a living document, and to be sensitive to intersectional harms that are not necessarily evident in legal drafting. But its power is that it is loyal to constitutional morality, a promise of change, not restraint.

For a country such as India, divided by caste, gender, religion, language, and class, the future of Article 14 is a mixed methodology, but one guided by substantive equality and complemented by proportionality. Both tests combined provide the subtlety, coherence, and moral authority needed to resolve 21st-century cases of discrimination and exclusion. They assure that the law will not merely be formally equal but also materially just.

Ultimately, Article 14 is not just a rule of law. It is a promise of the Constitution, one that requires not only non-discrimination but equal concern, not only fair treatment but outcomes that are fair as well. If the promise of equality is to be truly fulfilled, it requires a test that looks at the intention of the impact and the classification of the context.

To read more on similar topics click here.

Reviewed and published by Jeet Sinha and Astha Priya.