Written by Prakhar Singh¹

 BRIEF FACTS

On 10^th December 2020 journalist Sukkanya Shantha published a research-based article titled “From Segregation to Labour, Manu’s Caste Law Governs the Indian Prison System” that put a spotlight on deep-rooted caste-based discrimination inside Indian prisons. The article reported on multiple practices going on inside the prison, such as:

1. Segregation of prisoners in caste barracks and work assignments.

2.  Assignment of sanitation and manual scavenging duties to Dalit and Denotified Tribes

3. Continued classification of some communities as habitual offenders, which is a colonial-era nomenclature targeting DNTs, even post-independence.

Citing these instances, backed by related data, the petitioner moved to the Supreme Court under Article 32, challenging the constitutionality of discriminatory provisions found in prison manuals of various states. She contends that these violate Articles 14,15,17,21, and 23 and demanded that the apex court declare such practices illegal and unconstitutional.

The Union of India, in this case, was represented by ASG Aishwarya Bhati, who argued that the centre, through various advisories, has already cautioned and warned the states against such discrimination and cited the Model Prison Manual, 2016, and its recent February 2024 advisory as reform steps. The petitioner’s side was led by Senior Advocate Dr. S. Muralidhar and Advocate Disha Wadekar, who pointed out that these advisory /reforms just remained on paper and were largely ineffective.

States such as Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Odisha, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu participated in the hearing. Some states contended they had abandoned caste-based provisions in practice, and other states said that a process is underway to abolish such practices. The State of West Bengal asserted that certain rules of the 1967 Jail Code were “no longer in force” and awaiting deletion.

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. Article 14 – Equality before law and equal protection of laws
2. Article 15(1) & 15(2) – Prohibition of discrimination based on caste, religion, sex, etc.
3. Article 17 – Abolition of untouchability in any form
4. Article 21 – Right to life and personal liberty with dignity
5. Article 23 – Prohibition of forced labour

ISSUE INVOLVED

Whether the existence and continued implementation of caste-based segregation, labour allocation, and stigmatizing labels in State prison manuals violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 of the Constitution of India, despite reforms such as the Model Prison Manual, 2016 and the February 2024 advisory issued by the Union of India.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

The petitioner, Sukanya Shantha, was represented by Senior Advocate Dr. S. Muralidhar and Advocate Disha Wadekar. Their arguments mainly focused on constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity and non-discrimination and were backed by references to various state prison manuals that explicitly or indirectly preserved caste-based roles within the prison systems. The key submissions were as follows:

Codified caste discrimination

1. The petitioner argued that many prison manuals across India still assign
2. Sanitation work and cleaning exclusively for Dalits or other lower-caste prisoners.
3. Provided separate barracks for different castes
4. Stigmatising classifications like “habitual offenders” disproportionately target Dalit and Denotified Tribe communities.

Violation of Fundamental Rights

The petitioner argued that these practices are a grave and direct violation of Articles 14,15,17,21,23 of the constitution. They stressed on the fact that this ongoing discrimination was not incidental but structural and systematic which gained power from the administrative design of prison governance.

Ineffectiveness of Model Prison Manual, 2016

The Union of India relied mainly on the manual as evidence of reform, but the petitioners pointed out that-

• It only prohibits discrimination in kitchen duties, not overall prison labour
• It lacks enforcement authority over States.
• It has not been implemented uniformly across the country.
• Limited value of the February 2024 advisory
• The petitioners stated that the advisory was only issued after the filing of the petition
• It lacked a binding effect
• It failed to propose a systematic dismantling of caste-linked governance in prisons.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

The Union of India, represented by Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati, was joined by various State governments that included West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh. The arguments from the side of the respondent relied on the federal division of powers, ongoing reform efforts, and administrative functionality. The key submissions were as follows-

Federal Autonomy of Prison Governance

The Union said that prisons are a state subject under Entry 4 List II and thus the responsibility of the States. It asserted that it had fulfilled its part by issuing model frameworks and advisories

Model Prison Manual, 2016

The centre told the court that it had circulated a model prison manual in 2016, which-

• Discouraged caste-based segregation (specifically in the context of the kitchens).
• Advocated Humane treatment.
• It was available for adoption by states at their discretion.
• February 2024 Advisory
  The Union cited its February 26, 2024, advisory as evidence of active reforms that were underway for improvements. The advisory guide states to:
• Review their prison manuals
• Remove caste-, religion-, or community-based discriminatory rules.

JUDGMENT AND LEGAL REASONING IN SUKKANYA SHANTHA

Sitting on the Bench as the Chief Justice of India, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud framed the Judgment not merely as an adjudication of rights violation but as an occasion to reaffirm the Constitution’s role as an instrument of social upliftment, particularly against such incidents that were prevalent within state institutions. He touched upon many points in his whole judgment.

A. The Constitutional Blueprint- The Constitution as a Living Force Against Structural Injustice

The CJI D.Y. Chandrachud framed the case as a crucial moment in the evolution of constitutional ideas in addressing issues like caste-based discrimination that had quietly made their way within the prison system. He did not view the dispute as a question of administrative design, the Court used the Indian constitution as a modernising force and a charter for social liberation meant to undo historical wrongs rather than preserving them to echo in modern times.

In response to the Union’s submission stating that prisons fall within the State List (Entry 4, List II) and the Centre had already done its part by issuing advisories and model manuals, the Court held that the federal structure does not dilute constitutional supremacy. Justice Chandrachud came down strongly on this union’s contention and said that the distribution of legislative powers cannot shield the State from judicial review, particularly when fundamental rights are at stake. The CJI reiterated the nature of our constitution and said that-

“The Constitution is not merely aspirational; it is an emancipatory charter meant to be a lived reality.”

This framework allowed the court to dissect through the procedural justifications and focus mainly on substantive compliance with the constitutional values.

B. Article 14 – Equality Before Law and Attack on Arbitrariness

The Court’s examination under Article 14 was deeply doctrinal. Justice Chandrachud asserted that formal equality is inadequate where structural bias governs institutional life. Rules that appear neutral on the surface but then disproportionately harm certain communities are unconstitutional, even if they do not explicitly mention caste.

The Union had argued that provisions assigning labour were neutral and based on administrative efficiency, not caste. States such as West Bengal and Maharashtra submitted that such practices were no longer followed in reality and were “awaiting deletion” and therefore not actionable.

The court rejected this defence of the union. Justice Chandrachud stated that constitutional review was not merely confined to paper or official intent and extends to patterns of exclusion and effect.  He said that any kind of administrative inertia or informal deviation from the written rules does not cure its unconstitutionality. The court reiterated what was said in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu- “Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies”. Justice Chandrachud held that to retain rules that enable caste-based distinctions in labour or housing, even passively, generates arbitrariness and denies prisoners the equal protection of law.

C. Article 15 – Prohibition of Discrimination: From Formal Neutrality to Substantive Impact

Turning its attention to Article 15, the Court rejected the argument advanced by both the Union and the States that the manual did not explicitly name castes and thus no discrimination could be alleged. Justice Chandrachud strongly rejected this reasoning. He said that facial neutrality is no defence when the impact is discriminatory. He pointed out that a caste-based system of labour assignment that hides behind “custom” or “role-based logic” still violates Article 15 if its effect reinforces caste hierarchy. Citing the principles laid down in the Navtej Singh Johar case, the Court reinstated –

“If certain characteristics grounded in stereotypes, are to be associated with entire classes of people constituted as groups by any of the grounds prohibited in Article 15(1), that cannot establish a permissible reason to discriminate.”

The court highlighted that indirect and systematic discrimination is in complete contrast with the Indian Constitution and its principal framework of equality. It is not enough for the state to avoid naming the caste; instead, it must avoid replicating caste-based outcomes, regardless of terminology.

D. Article 17 – Abolition of Untouchability: Caste Practices in Prison as Modern-Day Untouchability

This section perhaps marks the judgment’s strongest moral stance. Justice Chandrachud here addressed the central argument raised by some States, where they said that segregation and labour roles were customary, administrative practices, not caste-based exclusions. The Court refused to accept custom as a constitutional shield. It held that caste-based exclusions, even if rationalised as “traditional” or “non-functional,” remain untouchability if they result in stigma, segregation, or subjugation. Untouchability, the Court ruled, is not a frozen term—it includes any system that assigns degraded roles based on caste.

“Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in the case Charles Sobraj v. Supdt., Central Jail, (1978)famously observed that the mere fact that a prisoner is ‘high-born or ill-bred’ is irrelevant in a secular socialist republic.”

This stance of the Court clarified that neither the absence of intent nor passive compliance shields the state. If a rule or practice results in caste-based exclusion or stigma, Article 17 is violated, irrespective of motive or legacy.

E. Article 21 – Right to Life with Dignity: From Incarceration to Constitutional Personhood

The Court, while analysing the case under Article 21, tackled the State’s contention that prison labour and segregation, even if outdated, were operational necessities or internal matters. Along with this, the State also argued that such assignments are part of “prison discipline” or are “non-discriminatory in practice.”

Justice Chandrachud here drew a fine and firm line between reformative labour and stigmatizing labour. The State’s argument that custom or silence equates to constitutionality was outrightly rejected by the Court. The court held that when prisoners from marginalized communities are subjected to discriminatory practices based on caste, their inherent dignity is violated.  The right to life includes freedom from institutional humiliation. Silence or non-implementation is not a valid justification when discrimination persists structurally.

F. Article 23 – Prohibition of Forced Labour: Caste-Based Compulsion as Constitutional Slavery

The union here attempted to differentiate penal labour (lawful under prison law) from forced labour, asserting before the court that these were assessments and were part of a legal prison regime. To this, Justice Chandrachud said that reformative, structured labour programs may be permissible, but the problem arises when labour is assigned specifically because of caste, and without pay or choice, it becomes a form of slavery, violating Article 23.

Justice Chandrachud cited the case Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat, in which a three-judge Bench of the apex court (Including Justice Chandrachud) invoked a broad scope of Article 23 to protect worker rights. Justice Chandrachud said that Article 23 can also be applied to situations inside prisons, if the prisoners are subjected to degrading labour or other similar oppressive practices. The respondents’ framing of caste-coded labour as part of “routine prison work” was rejected as an attempt to normalize oppression under administrative language.

As its final decision, the Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, speaking through CJI D.Y. Chandrachud, held that caste-based segregation, discriminatory prison labour assignments, and the use of labels in State prison manuals constitute a grave violation of Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 of the Constitution. The courts held such practices to be unconstitutional and struck down such provisions of the prison manuals.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s decision in Sukanya Shanta v. Union of India is a crucial constitutional step taken by the Supreme Court of the country one that extends the emancipatory promise of the Constitution into the very structure of India’s carceral system. By carefully analyzing the caste-based prison practices going inside the prison institutions of the country through the lens of various Articles such as 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23, the court not only struck down the caste-based prison practices but also framed them as active denials of human dignity, equality, and liberty rejecting the logic that caste hierarchies, even if customary or “non-operational,” can be tolerated under a constitutional regime.

Justice Chandrachud’s judgment is not merely a corrective measure to a malpractice; it is indeed visionary. It draws strength from Ambedkar’s foresight, from the Constituent Assembly’s warnings, and decades of jurisprudence that saw the Constitution as a living organism and not a static document. It breaks new ground by holding that forced labour and degrading tasks, when assigned based on caste identity, amount to structural violence—even if imposed within the regulated walls of a prison. Above all, the judgment reasserts that constitutional morality, not historical inertia, must govern State institutions.

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1. Prakhar Singh, BA LLB, 2nd Year, NUSRL, Ranchi ↩︎