The Governor’s Office Under Scrutiny: Time for a Constitutional Reset?

Author: Shana Parveen

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Legal SYNK.

Introduction

The governor of a state takes oath as per Article 159 of the constitution of India, he or she swears- hand on heart, Infront of the nation- “to preserve, protect, and defend the constitution and the law”.

A beautiful, honest and noble oath, the kind of words that makes you believe that the constitution is in safe hands but I ask whose hands exactly?

Because the governor who swears to protect the constitution and the law is not chosen by the state that is, he is not elected or we can say he is “selected” by the President on the aid and advice of the council of ministers and the prime minister or in simple understanding indirectly by the central government itself quietly through a process a common citizen of a state has nothing to do with, where a chief minister is chosen by the people of state but the governor who sits above the chief minister, who can act on his advice and even choose not to and is supposed to work for the welfare of the state is not elected by the people of the state but selected by the central government.

So a fair question arises here that “if the governor’s decisions are meant to serve or even effect the interest of the people of the state, then should it not be the people of state who decides who will get to be their governor”?

In the world’s largest democracy, the president, the highest constitutional head of the country is at least indirectly “elected”. The prime minister has to win the trust of a directly elected house and even a small-town municipal councillor or a mukhiya in a panchayat is elected then why not the highest constitutional head of a state is elected?

The governor sits over an entire state who can block laws passed by elected legislators, the one who decides which party gets the chance to form the government is just “appointed” that too by the centre and the process has nothing to do with the state, I again ask is the process really democratic in the world’s largest democracy?

What does the constitution says about the governor? The legislature and the current setup!

The constitution of India has a lot to say about the governors but if we read all of the provisions carefully it takes back to the same place that is “the centre”.

Article 153 says every state shall have a governor, fine, but then came the seventh constitutional amendment act 1956, which says that the same person can serve as the governor of two or more states at once. Why one person in multiple states? The question that the constitution does not bother to answer is, will this amendment really allow for genuine attention to any one of those states?

Further, Article 155 tells us how the governor is appointed- By the President.

We observe that Article 74 talks about the president to act on the aid and advice of the council of ministers headed by the prime minister, so why is the constitution saying that it is the president who appoints the governors where it really means the central cabinet appoints the governor. The state gets no seat on the table whose future has to be decided by the centre selected governor.

Article 156 says the governor serves a five-year term but holds office during the pleasure of the president, here the five year is not a guarantee but is a ceiling and the centre can end the governor’s tenure just another day without any accountability and explanation to the state.  

Article 157 says that to become the constitutional head of state, you just need to be a citizen of India, above thirty years of age, not a sitting legislator and not holding any office of profit. But let’s take pause and that this is the entire list, no knowledge or experience required about the language, culture of the administration of the state, a complete outsider can be the head of a state in return he has of a certain age and should hold an Indian citizenship.

Article 163 says that the governor acts on the aid and advice of the council of ministers headed by the chief minister of the state-except where the constitution requires the governor to use his own discretion. It is fine but the problem here is that the constitution is not clarifying how wide this discretion which again leaves us suspecting the independence of the governors’ decisions.

And finally, Article 200 gives the governors power over every bill passed by the states elected legislature. He gives assent, withholds it or even reserve the bills for the again sending it back to the centre. And this very power has been in question if we look upon the contemporary examples such as the Tamil Nadu governor’s case.

Going through these provisions makes the picture very clear that the superior here is the centre then how can we expect independence and unbiased decisions from the constitutional head of the state.

Warnings by the Founding Fathers

The framers saw this coming and argued about it during the very commencement of the constitution. This very concern was debated, loudly and passionately during the formation of constitution by the constituent assembly before anything was finalised,

The question before the assembly was very clear that whether the governor of a state should be “appointed or elected”?

Where K.M Munshi and Jawaharlal Nehru also with other members talked in favour of the appointment process of the governor, but two voices in particular gave dissenting arguments they were Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla supported by T.T Krishnamachari.

Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla warned– “the governor under instructions from the centre will try to run the administration in a certain way, while the cabinet of a different political party would try to run it in their own way” and these were words of experience because he had served as minister under british appointed governors and he very well knew that how this decision can turn into an instrument of tyranny.

Krishnamachari, even while supporting the final decision to go with nomination paused and quoted “we do not want the governor to be the agent of the centre” he further argued that the nominated governors was meant to be neutral- someone who holds impartiality, untouched by politics of either the state or the centre.

They were not just casual remarks of the past by these visionary men, but the ignored warnings spoken on the floor of the constituent assembly itself. When the votes were counted, the nomination clause was adopted and the warnings were set aside. 

But let’s pause for a moment and understand that the members who voted that day were not infallible. They were human beings, doing best to imagine a future they could not see at that time and like most of the human judgements theirs were also capable of errors too. And the framers knew this, which is why they gave us a constitution that can be amended, they build in means to correct their own errors and why not let’s visit and correct this one too.

However, sometimes the dissenting voices are the ones that form a part of reality in future as we observe in the contemporary India, where the governor is mere puppet of the union government violating the very essence of democracy.

The fears raised by these voices did became true, years later, where the union government found in the governor’s office a convenient tool through which they can work against the state government and weaken them from the very within. And the governor, the very person meant to protect the interest of the state works opposite of it.

The fear that became reality: Contemporary Examples

In the state of Tamil Nadu, the governor R.N Ravi in 2023  sat on 10 bills passed by the state legislature for years without granting assent to which the state government of Tamil Nadu accused governor Ravi of acting like a “political rival” rather than a constitutional functionary, creating a “constitutional deadlock” with a delay stretching back as far as 2020 for some bills.

The supreme court declared this conduct as “unconstitutional” using its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the constitution of India and set specific timeline for action. And upon this the supreme court was asked on presidential reference under article 143 and asked certain questions to supreme court and then in 16^th presidential reference of 2025, a 5 judges bench of supreme court gave judgement that no timeline can be fixed to the president or governor to act on the bills passed by the legislature.

And similarly, Telangana governor Tamilisai was accused by the state government to deliberately delaying assent to bills passed by an elected legislature, effectively working as a roadblock rather than a constitutional head.

Or if we take the example of west Bengal, where the governor C.V Ananda Bose resigned abruptly in 2026 nearly two years before his term was due to end, just weeks ahead of the assembly elections. It was a resignation that triggered immediate allegations of central pressure from C M Mamta Banerjee.

And these are not mere isolated sparks, infact these are the part of fire that is been burning from decades from one state to another state regardless which party is sitting in the union government. Such as in 2022, Kerala’s governor Arif Mohammad and states left government traded public accusations for years over university appointment and stalled bill.

Different states, different times, yet the same pattern. The very fear Sa’adulla raised that the governor appointed by the centre would inevitably reflect the centre politics especially when the ruling party and the centre are two different parties. And as we observe, it’s no longer a waring but is into practice and will increase years after years and thus we need to make amendment to these provisions protecting the Democracy of this country.

Centre’s Unchecked Power over States

While Article 200 shows that how the governor can quietly block a state’s voice, Article 356 how the governor can end it altogether. Article 356 allows that a president’s rule can be imposed in the state if the governor is satisfied that the government of the state is not functioning according to the constitution. But here is a catch that the satisfaction which is with the president is based entirely on the governors report, that governor who has been appointed by the president or the centre itself, and his report is used to dismiss a states government.

Here, article 356 appears undemocratic because it violates the principle of democracy, since an elected government is being suspended, damaging the federal balance between the state and the union.

S.R. Bommai: The Judicial Check on Central Overreach

In 1994, a nine judge bench delivered what is now one of the most cited judgements in Indian constitutional history. The court ruled that the president’s proclamation under article 356 must be exercised with caution, is subject to judicial review and requires the approval of both the houses within two months, failing which it lapses. Most importantly, the court held that a state governments majority must be tested on the floor of the assembly and not on governor’s report to the president.  

Interestingly, the seeds of this idea were sown much earlier where back in 1977 in the case of State of Rajasthan versus Union of India, the court already hinted that the president’s satisfaction under article 356, though is largely beyond questioning, still could be challenged if any malafide intention is visible.

This is where the Sarkaria Commission 1988 finally found teeth where the supreme court drew on the sarkaria commissions report and laid down very clearly where and when the use of article 356 would be proper and improper.

Disregarded Warnings: What Commissions Warned and Union Ignored

If we go deeper into the Sarkaria commission report, Article 356 was a mere headline. And as the commission has uncovered that the problem had started much earlier with who gets appointed as the Governor at the first place.

The office had become a dumping ground for politicians, where the ruling party at the centre could not place elsewhere therefore crowned them with a Raj Bhawan instead of ministry. The numbers backed this up as survey of appointments upto 1984 found that over 60% of the governors had been active politicians- until the day of their appointment, a sharp fall from Nehru years, when the eminent, non-political people were far more common.

And to fix this, the commission had laid down various criterias, which included that the appointee must be eminent in some field, should be from outside the state, be a detached figure and not be deep into local politics or have been too active in politics recently. And most importantly, a politician from the ruling party at the centre should never be made governor of a state run by different party and this was a direct answer to the very question raised by Sa’adulla back in 1949. The commission also recommended that the five years terms given to the governors should rarely be cut short. Yet the data said otherwise: of 154 tenures between 1947 and 1986, 104 that is two out of every three governors’ tenures ended early that is before 5 years and especially after 1967.

Another safeguard to enforce this was consultation with the state chief minister before appointment had become a mere formality and it also found out that the union usually just informed the CM after the fact and sometimes event not that.

None of this was asking for something new. It was only asking the system to finally keep a promise it made way back in 1949, a promise that has still been unfulfilled and simply has turned into a corrupt unconstitutional system.

Years between 1977 and 1985 nearly 1,130 State bills were sent to the centre, many simply disappearing into delay. One bill, the trade union’s West Bengal Amendment bill 1969– waited 12 years before ascent was finally refused in 1982. Ordinance misuse was worse still, one governor re-issued ordinances 256 times between 1967 and 1981, some kept alive for 14 years, completely bypassing the legislature, a practice that Supreme Court called “fraud on a constitutional provision”.

Punchhi commission went further than the sarkaria commission as it directly proposed their recommendation written in the constitution, through an amendment to Article 157 making it absolutely binding. The NCRWC  (National commission to review the working of the constitution) endorsed by the Punchhi commission suggested that article 155 and 156 be amended so the appointment of the governor is entrusted to a committee comprising the PM, the Union Home Minister, the speaker of the Lok Sabha, and the chief minister of the concerned state, possibly including the vice-president- arguing this would make the process transparent and unambiguous, rather than relying on confidential and informal consultations.

And on Article 356, the commission was clear: that the assembly cannot be dissolved until parliament approves the proclamation. The state must be warned before any action taken. A governments majority must be tested on the floor of the house and never upon the governors report as the SR Bommai case already established. And the report itself must be a document which is clear, precise statement of facts, not a vague letter hiding political intent behind constitutional language.

And yet even as these commissions wrote their recommendations, reality continued to move in the opposite direction. And Manipur in 2025 is one of the most uncomfortable examples as the ethnic violence broke and thousands losses of lives were witnessed, the governor was present throughout. The discretionary power to report to the president under article 356 existed throughout and yet for nearly two years nothing really moved.

Manipur 2025- Where the Governor stood like a bystander

When presidents rule was finally imposed in Manipur, it came not after a careful constitutional assessment but came when the CM there resigned, repotedly to pre-empt a no-confidence motion that the opposition was very ready to move the next day and on X Jairam Ramesh posted also that “tomorrow, the congress party was going to move a non-confidence motion. The Manipur CM realised he does not have a majority and thus decided to resign by himself”.

And here lies the deepest irony that both the centre and the state government in Manipur belonged to the ruling party that is the BJP. This was not the case of centre using the governor to destabilise an opposition ruled state. And yet even here, the Governor’s report — the very document that triggers Article 356 — arrived only after a political crisis within the ruling party had already made the state ungovernable. For nearly two years of documented violence, the Governor’s discretion to act had apparently found no urgency. The moment political survival was at stake, the constitutional machinery moved swiftly.

If a Governor cannot be relied upon to act on the basis of a constitutional breakdown rather than a political one — even when both governments share the same party flag — then the question is no longer about bias alone. It is about whether the institution, as currently designed and appointed, is capable of functioning as a genuine constitutional sentinel at all.

The crisis that needs to be resolved

After decades of documented misuse, ignored warnings, and unfulfilled promises, the question is no longer whether the system needs a relook infact it is whether we have the will to fix this.

We the citizen of India, the largest democracy in the world, stand firmly behind what the sarkaria commission recommended all those years ago. Its criteria for appointment were not radical demands but were bare minimum recognition that a constitutional office of this importance deserves. We want those recommendations implemented like nothing else but law.

But implementation alone is not enough. Decades have passed since those recommendations were made, and every government has found ways to work around them because they were never binding and that is why we should take one step further and demand for constitutional amendment.

Amendment whether it is of qualifications of a governor, the phrase “pleasure of the president”, composition of a formal committee for the appointment of the governor so that it does not remain the centres choice of governor, and most importantly fixing a timeline for a governor to assent the bill passed in the state legislative assembly.

And above all- the floor of the house must remain, without exception, the only place where a governments majority is tested. No Governors personal assessment, no private letter, no midnight report should ever again be sufficient to bring down an elected state government.

These are not new ideas but have been sitting in commission reports and court judgements for decades. All they need is a political will to become constitutional reality.

Conclusion

India the largest Democracy in the world, asks the Governor to swear by the constitution, but lacks the democracy while choosing them. Two commissions warned us, the Apex Court of the nation corrected us, the seventy-five years of evidences has shown us. And yet, where are we, there are times where the bills disappears for many years, an assembly falls on a midnight report, a governor watches a state burn and what we choose to do is just look away.

The founding members gave us a constitution that can be amended but we Indians are not fortunate enough to have a government willing to amend it.